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The Proposed Balanced Budget/Tax
Limitation Constitutional
Amendment: No Balance, No
Limits
By PETER W. RODINO, JR.*
Introduction
Much of the legitimate public frustration with continuing, record
shattering federal budget deficits has been corralled by supporters of
proposed constitutional amendments that purport to require a balanced
federal budget. The Senate approved such an amendment in 1982, but
a similar proposal failed to gain the two-thirds constitutional majority
in the House of Representatives. The ultimate objective of the pro-
posed amendments-increased budgetary discipline of governmental
decisionmakers-may be sound. However, the central issue is whether
the proposed amendments would achieve this objective without impos-
ing crippling costs.
This Commentary reviews the questions underlying the debate
over the constitutional amendments, focusing principally on H.R.J.
Res. 350, the proposed amendment the House considered-and re-
jected-in the Ninety-seventh Congress.' It argues that this proposed
amendment places too high a priority on a single objective; is based on
dubious economic assumptions; is misleading because it will not lead
* Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary. Dean of the New Jersey Congres-
sional Delegation. J.D., Rutgers Univ., 1937.
1. H.R.J. Res. 350, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H7946 (1981). Representa-
tive Ed Jenkins introduced H.R.J. Res. 350 on October 29, 1981, for himself and others. The
proposed amendment was written as follows:
"Section 1. Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress shall adopt a statement of receipts and
outlays for that year in which total outlays are no greater than total receipts. The Congress
may amend such statement provided revised outlays are no greater than revised receipts.
Whenever three-fifths of the whole number of both Houses shall deem it necessary, Con-
gress in such statement may provide for a specific excess of outlays over receipts by a vote
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to, let alone guarantee, a balanced budget or meaningful budgetary dis-
cipline; is likely either to be unenforceable or to restructure in some
unknown and unprecedented way the traditional allocation of power
among the three branches of American government; and is antithetical
to traditional American principles of majority rule. This amendment,
if ever adopted, would trivialize our Constitution and would be mean-
ingless at best, devastating at worst. It cannot substitute for the firm
political resolve urgently needed to balance our economy so as to cope
with our pressing national problems. This Commentary concludes by
setting forth several alternatives that would provide greater budgetary
discipline, while avoiding the pitfalls of a constitutional amendment.
I. The Balanced Budget Movement
Three principal concerns have prompted the recent interest exhib-
ited by the citizenry, the states, and the Congress in constitutional
change to require a balanced budget. The first and most commonly
cited concern centers on the levels of federal taxes, expenditures, and,
most importantly, deficits.2 Proponents of an amendment suggest that
directed solely to that subject. The Congress and the President shall ensure that actual out-
lays do not exceed the outlays set forth in such statement.
"Section 2. Total receipts for any fiscal year set forth in the statement adopted pursuant
to this article shall not increase by a rate greater than the rate of increase in national income
in the last calendar year ending before such fiscal year, unless a majority of the whole
number of both Houses of Congress shall have passed a bill directed solely to approving
specific additional receipts and such bill has become law.
"Section 3. The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal year in
which a declaration of war is in effect.
"Section 4. The Congress may not require that the States engage in additional activities
without compensation equal to the additional costs.
"Section 5. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United States except those
derived from borrowing and total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States ex-
cept those for repayment of debt principal.
"Section 6. This article shall take effect for the second fiscal year beginning after its
ratification."
The House considered H.R.J. Res. 350 on Oct. 1, 1982, and rejected it by a vote of 236
to 187. 128 CONG. REC. H8337 (1981). The proposal thus fell 46 votes short of the required
two-thirds majority.
2. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BALANCED BUDGET-TAX LIMITA-
TION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as SENATE REPORT]: "Two statements summarize the economic issues
addressed by S.J. Res. 58: a) The federal sector has become increasingly prone to deficit
financing since World War II; and b) the federal sector, during that period, has come to
command an increasing share of the nation's economic output and income."
As of fiscal year 1982, the federal budget has had a deficit for every year since 1969.
Federal budgets have run deficits for 19 of the last 20 years and for 42 of the last 50 years.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BALANCING THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND LIMITING FED-
ERAL SPENDING: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY APPROACHES 9 (1982) [hereinafter
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
persistently high levels of federal expenditures evidence the inability of
elected officials to use existing mechanisms to resist special interest ap-
peals for expenditures of public funds.3 The recent sharp rise in the
growth of the deficit and the despair of seeing any sharp downturn un-
doubtedly fuel the amendment drive.
A second concern is the feeling of many that the federal govern-
ment has become too large and intrusive a force in the economy and in
American life generally.4 Proponents point to the incremental growth
in recent years of federal spending as a proportion of gross national
product (GNP).5
A third concern cited by proponents of the amendment arises from
the interplay of inflation with the progressive income tax structure of
the Internal Revenue Code.6 In inflationary periods, absent a system of
tax rates indexed to inflation, the relative tax burden on the taxpayer
will rise. As inflation pushes up the taxpayer's income (to correspond
with increases in the general price level), the taxpayer will be driven
into increasingly higher tax brackets and thereby pay a greater portion
of real income to the federal government. Proponents of a balanced
budget amendment suggest that this so called "bracket creep" permits
tax revenues to rise without the need for legislated tax increases or im-
proved collection methods, and therefore provides an expedient way of
cited as CBO STUDY]. In recent years, however, deficits have grown enormously as a result
of increases in defense spending and tax cuts. Previously, deficits had been shrinking as a
percentage of gross national product (GNP). Id Presently, deficits in excess of $150 billion
are projected for each of the next three years. Id at 7.
3. The alleged inability to resist such appeals is said to arise from the so-called "con-
centrated benefit-dispersed cost" phenomenon. In describing why the "legislative process
itself. . . is flawed," the SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2, states: "The tax-spending
interests are intense and articulate in support of their programs-for they normally stand to
gain considerable amounts of public funds on a per capita basis-while the tax-paying inter-
ests are diffuse and unorganized-for they stand to lose only nominal sums in the context of
any single spending program. Such an unequal competition for tax dollars, not surprisingly,
results in defeat more often than not for the tax-paying interests."
4. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34, 38.
5. Id at 35-38; Constitutional Amendments Seeking to Balance the Budget and Limit
Federal Spending: Hearings Before the Subcomnm on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 319, 320 (1982) (statement of Hon.
Donald T. Regan, Secretary, Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
Federal budget outlays as a percentage of GNP have grown modestly over the past few
decades. In the fiscal year 1951, outlays were about 14.6% of GNP; in 1961, they were
19.2%; in 1971, they were 20.4%, and by 1981, they were 23%. See CBO STuDY, supra note
2, at 16. By other measures--e.g., the number of civilian employees--the "contention of
bigness cannot be confirmed." Id
6. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, 43; Hearings, supra note 5, at 321 (statement of
Hon. Donald T. Regan).
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increasing revenues without congressional voting to raise taxes.'
These concerns are not new. Americans have traditionally been
apprehensive about management of their national budget, tax levels,
and the growth of government. Presidential candidates from the time
of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt have vowed to balance the
budget.8 The sprawling federal bureaucracy has been studied by Con-
gress and national commissions for the last three decades.9 Public out-
cry over tax levels, said to have contributed to the American
Revolution, seems to have abated only sporadically since that time.
In light of this tradition, it is hardly surprising that public opinion
polls consistently show that, in the abstract, Americans favor the con-
cept of a balanced budget amendment."' A majority of state legisla-
tures have called for the Congress to send forth an amendment for
7. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 104(a) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § I(f) (Supp. 1982)) (amending I.R.C. § 1),
provides for indexation of federal income and estate taxes no later than December 15, 1984.
8. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-24. Efforts to amend the Constitution to re-
quire a balanced budget date from 1935. Id at 17.
9. In 1947, Congress created by statute a Commission on Organization of the Execu-
tive Branch, the so-called "first Hoover Commission," named after its Chairman, President
Herbert Hoover. Pub. L. No. 47-162, 61 Stat. 246 (1947). Congress created a second Hoover
Commission in 1953. Pub. L. No. 83-108, 67 Stat. 184 (1953). See generally R. MOE, EXEC-
UTIVE BRANCH REORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REP. No. 77-246G, at 18-26 (1977). President Eisenhower maintained from 1953 to 1961 a
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization under the direction of Nel-
son Rockefeller. Exec. Order No. 10,432, 18 Fed. Reg. 617 (1953). Dean James Landis
wrote a report for President-elect John Kennedy on regulatory agencies. SUBCOMM. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT
ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960). President Johnson created a
Task Force on Government Organization under Ben Heineman. R. MOE, EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, supra at 31. President Nixon established the President's Advisory Council on Ex-
ecutive Organization under Roy Ash. R. MOE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra at 32. President
Carter appointed a President's Reorganization Project. R. MOE, THE CARTER REORGANI-
ZATION EFFORT: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REP.
No. 80-172 (1980). President Reagan has created the President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control in the Federal Government. Exec. Order No. 12,369, 47 Fed. Reg. 288-99
(1982).
10. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; CBO STUDY, supra note 2, at 28-30. Pro-
ponents often cite these polls, which purport to show that the vast majority of Americans
favor the idea of a constitutional amendment. Generally, however, these polls do not tie the
balancing of the budget to the spending reductions in such vital areas as social security and
defense that would be necessary to balance the budget. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 73;
128 CONG. REC. S7996-97 (daily ed. July 12, 1982) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Other polls in
which respondents are asked whether they favor spending cuts in specific policy areas show
that majorities favor deficits rather than spending reductions. CBO STUDY, supra note 2, at
28-30.
ratification, or alternatively, for a constitutional convention." While
these expressions show strong public support for a balanced budget
amendment in the abstract, for the most part, they do not reflect a care-
ful analysis of the costs and practicability of such an amendment.
The congressional response to this public sentiment demonstrates
the difficulty of achieving a constitutional solution. In the Ninety-sev-
enth Congress alone, members of the House introduced more than
sixty-five resolutions representing a wide variety of approaches. In var-
ious combinations, these proposals contain provisions with balanced
budget "requirements,"' 2 spending limitations, 3 revenue limitations,'
4
borrowing limitations, 5 and mandated schedules for the repayment of
the national debt.'6 Even within the general rubric of "balanced
budget proposals," the resolutions would operate in widely varying
11. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13; Hildreth, Chancesfor an Amendment to Bal-
ance the Budget, 13 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 5, 1982, at 84. These resolutions are
not uniform and do not specify a single text.
12. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 2, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R.J.
Res. 14, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68-69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
13. Some "absolute" spending limitation proposals would limit federal expenditures to
a specified fraction of GNP or national income. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 3, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 82, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127
CONG. REC. H90 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 113, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. H176 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1981). Other "relative" spending limitations would limit the
growth of federal spending on the basis of past ratios of federal spending to GNP or national
income. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 4,97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 43, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H70 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
14. Like spending limitations, some revenue limitations are absolute, see, e.g., H.R.J.
Res. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981), while others are
relative, limiting increases to growth patterns in prior years. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 100, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H132 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 211, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H1035 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 350, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7946 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1981).
15. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 14, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68-69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 555, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4890 (daily ed. July 29, 1982). S.J.
Res. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 52892 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1981), as altered in
the Senate by a floor amendment offered by Senators Armstrong and Boren, would require a
supermajority vote to raise the debt limit. 128 CONG. REc. S9626-33 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1982).
16. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 10, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 14, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68-69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
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manners. Some merely declare that the budget shall be balanced, 7
while others restrict the power of Congress to appropriate.' 8 Various
proposals require Congress to plan a balanced budget;" place a general
duty on Congress to balance the budget;20 require a supermajority to
approve a planned unbalanced budget;2 mandate that a deficit be ex-
tinguished within a given period;22 or merely establish a balanced
budget as a goal.23 Finally, there are differences in such basic matters
as whether the restrictions could be waived in times of war or other
national emergency, and, if so, what emergency would suffice; 24 how
the restrictions would be enforced;25 and the anticipated role of the Ex-
17. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 19, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 100, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H132 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981).
18. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 2, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 11, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 14, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68-69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
19. Both H.R.J. Res. 350 and S.J. Res. 58 employ the "predictive statement" approach.
Other resolutions use this approach as well. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 157, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.,
127 CONG. REc. H350 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG. REC. H1035 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 546, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. H4594 (daily ed. July 23, 1982).
20. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 10, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan.
6, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 41, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
21. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2892 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 350, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7946 (daily ed. Oct. 29,
1981).
22. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 33, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69 (daily ed. Jan.
6, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 157, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H350 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1981); H.R.J. Res. 181, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H548 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1981).
23. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H69 (daily ed. Jan.
6, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 181, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H548 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1981).
24. There is an important difference on this point between the Administration and the
House sponsors of H.R.J. Res. 350. H.R.J. Res. 350 would limit waivers to fiscal years in
which war had been declared; the Administration favors expanding the waiver to situations
of imminent and unforseeable threat to national security. Hearings, supra note 5, at 226, 239
(statement of Hon. David A. Stockman, Director, Office of Management & Budget). Others
would allow waivers in time of national emergency as declared by a supermajority. See,
e.g., H.R.J. Res. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981);
H.R.J. Res. 3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R.J.
Res. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
25. Some proposals would empower Congress to enforce their provisions through ap-
propriate legislation. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 10, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed.
Jan. 6, 1981); H.R.J. Res. 42, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981). At least one proposal, H.R.J. Res. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981) would give the President power to impose an income tax surcharge;
another, H.R.J. Res. 21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981),
would simply give the President item veto power. An amendment to S.J. Res. 58 that would
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ecutive in the budget process. 26
The debate in the Senate further demonstrates the proponents'
lack of consensus on the best approach. The Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a propo-
sal that was approved, with substantial dissent, by the full Committee.
Even before the matter was considered by the full Senate, however, the
Committee made a further key change, deleting a provision that osten-
sibly would have required full federal compensation for the cost of any
new responsibilities imposed on the states.27 In the lengthy debate on
the Senate floor, four more changes were made before final approval.28
In the House, the most widely supported measure was H.R.J. Res.
350. While it was identical to the resolution that the Senate Judiciary
Committee originally reported, it differed in five respects from the reso-
have explicitly precluded judicial enforcement power was defeated on the Senate floor by a
51 to 45 vote. 128 CONG. REc. S9392-9407 (daily ed. July 29, 1982).
26. Some proposals would require the President to submit a balanced budget. See, e.g.,
H.R.J. Res. 9, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H68 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R.J.
Res. 25, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H69 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981). An amendment
to require the President to submit a balanced budget was defeated in the Senate by a 53 to 43
vote. 128 CONG. REc. S9294-99 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
27. Section 4 was deleted, apparently out of a recognition that it would be complicated
to administer and would engender litigation. 128 CONG. REC. 57984 (daily ed. July 12,
1982) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan explained, "As
worded, this section could entangle the federal government in lengthy litigation regarding
almost any ongoing federal activity or program. We urge that this section be dropped."
Hearings, supra note 5, at 318 (statement of Hon. Donald T. Regan).
28. These changes are as follows: 1) In § 1, adding in the last sentence after "shall" the
phrase "pursuant to legislation or through exercise of their powers under the first and second
articles." The purpose of this change is to make clear that the duty imposed on the President
by § 1 to "ensure" that actual outlays do not exceed statement outlays does not create any
new impoundment powers. 128 CONG. Rnc. S9178-80 (daily ed. July 27, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Domenici). 2) In § 2, the phrase "last calendar year ending" was stricken and inserted
in its place was "year or years ending not less than six months nor more than twelve
months." The purpose of this change was to allow Congress more flexibility in choosing a
base period to measure the amount by which federal receipts would be allowed to grow in
the fiscal year. Id 3) A new § 5 was added, providing that "Congress shall enforce and
implement this article by appropriate legislation." The purpose of this section is to make
clear the duty and power of Congress to enact implementing legislation, .d at 9184-86.
4) A new § 6 was added, reading: "On and after the date this article takes effect, the amount
of the federal debt as of such date shall become permanent and there shall be no increase in
such amount unless three-fifths of the whole number of both Houses of Congress shall have
passed a bill approving such increase and such bill has become law." This is the amendment
cosponsored by Senators Armstrong and Boren. The effect of the amendment is to establish
a mechanism to ensure that forecasts of receipts are not overly optimistic. If there is a
shortfall of receipts, H.R.J. Res. 350 would allow the necessary borrowing and any increase
in the debt limit would require only a majority of both Houses. Under this amendment, a
supermajority would be required. 128 CONG. Rc. S9726-27 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982) (state-
ment of Sen. Boren).
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lution the Senate finally endorsed.2 9 During the House deliberations,
the Administration, fervent in support of H.R.J. Res. 350, advocated
yet another change. °
H.R.J. Res. 350 combines two concepts-a plan for a balanced
budget and a limitation on the growth of receipts.3 Section 1 requires
Congress, prior to the beginning of each fiscal year, to adopt a state-
ment of receipts and outlays in which total outlays do not exceed total
receipts; gives the Congress power to amend the statement provided
revised outlays do not exceed revised receipts; provides for a planned
deficit only if three-fifths of the "whole number of both Houses" shall
deem it necessary by a vote directed solely to that subject; and directs
the Congress and the President "to ensure that actual outlays do not
exceed" the statement outlays. Section 2, the revenue limitation, pro-
vides that
[t]otal receipts for any fiscal year. . . shall not increase by a rate
greater than the rate of increase in national income in the last
calendar year ending before such fiscal year, unless a majority of
the whole number of both Houses. .. shall have passed a bill
directed solely to approving specific additional increases and
such bill has become law.
Section 3 provides that Congress may waive the requirements of the
amendment in any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect.
Section 4 prohibits the Congress from requiring that the states engage
in additional activities without offsetting compensation.12 Section 5 de-
scribes total receipts as excluding borrowed funds, and total outlays as
excluding repayment of debt principal. Section 6 provides that the
amendment shall go into effect the second year after ratification. 3
The House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law
extensively studied the various proposals during fourteen hearings in
the Ninety-sixth and Ninety-seventh Congresses, taking testimony and
comments from a variety of experts of varying political views, includ-
ing current and former Cabinet level officials, Nobel Laureates in eco-
nomics, and constitutional scholars. These experts pointed out a
number of fundamental problems with H.R.J. Res. 350. Amendments
considered by the Subcommittee would have addressed some of these
underlying deficiencies, but the fallacy of locking a particular economic
theory into the Constitution would remain.
29. See supra notes 27 and 28.
30. See supra note 24.
31. For the complete text of H.R.J. Res. 350 see supra note 1.
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 1.
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Although proponents, in effect, succeeded in discharging the Judi-
ciary Committee from further consideration of H.R.J. Res. 350 in Sep-
tember 1982, in October the full House considered and rejected H.R.J.
Res. 350, as well as a milder substitute offered by Representative Bill
Alexander (D-Ark.).34
The hopes of proponents have, in short, run squarely into the real-
ities of devising a workable amendment. Thus far, proceedings in the
Congress underline the concern of experts with varying political views
that any amendment would be nothing more than a constitutional
hoax, engendering cynicism about our greatest document and distract-
ing our attention from the most important task at hand-to channel the
strong political will for more budgetary discipline into constructive
political action assuring an overall balanced economy.
II. Balanced Budget In Perspective
Proponents of H.R.J. Res. 350 state that a principal purpose would
be to establish a balanced federal budget as a "norm.'" While, in the
abstract, such a budget may be desirable, achieving it in the proposed
manner may carry a high price that cannot be ignored in deciding
whether a balanced budget should be established as a constitutional
"'norm"
Our Constitution endows the federal government with specific
enumerated powers and entrusts it with limited but vital responsibili-
ties,36 among which are the responsibilities of providing for the defense
of our nation;37 collecting and expending funds for the general welfare
of our people;38 regulating interstate and foreign commerce; 39 and ad-
ministering justice.40 These immense responsibilities, and the limited
resources available for meeting them, require that the government
choose among competing goals, of which a balanced budget is but one.
34. The House rejected H.R.J. Res. 350 by a vote of 236 to 187. 128 CONG. REc. H8336
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982). The House rejected the Alexander Substitute by a vote of 346 to 77.
Id at H3019 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1980).
35. See, e.g, SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 75; 128 CONG. REC. 57982 (daily ed.
July 12, 1982) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
36. The Preamble recites that the purpose of the Constitution is "to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common Defense, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
." U.S. CONST. preamble.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11, 16; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; art. IV, § 4.
38. Id at art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
39. Id at art. 1, § 8, ci. 3.
40. Id at art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III.
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In times of economic adversity, the choices between competing
uses of resources become all the more difficult. The current Adminis-
tration assigns defense spending a very high priority. It is, of course,
not possible, in this day of modem weaponry, for the United States to
rely on geographic isolation from Europe for its security. While esti-
mates on how much is needed vary, even proponents of reduced mili-
tary outlays recognize the need to spend substantial sums for the
common defense.
At least since the New Deal, the federal government has recog-
nized its broad responsibility to provide for the wel being of its citi-
zens. Full employment, Social Security and income assistance, the
maintenance of a national system of roads and waterways, the preser-
vation of our environment, the funding of vital research, the safety of
American workers, the health of our citizens, and assisting the states in
the education of future generations are a few of the responsibilities that
the federal government must meet.
Placing a balanced budget in perspective among these priorities
requires, in my view, a twofold recognition. First, as some proponents
have realized, a balanced budget in itself is not absolutely necessary for
a sound economic policy. The size of a deficit,41 how it is financed 4 2
and prevailing economic conditions43 are critical in determining
whether a deficit can be tolerated. Second, a balanced budget is but a
part of a larger fiscal policy that includes other aspects such as levels of
41. It would, of course, be possible for the government to run a small deficit every year.
As long as real growth of the economy outpaced the growth of the deficit, no problem would
arise.
42. As OMB Director Stockman candidly acknowledged in debate when he was a mem-
ber of the House: "I would suggest to the House ... that the budget balancing frenzy that
has been underway in this institution for some weeks now is mainly an exercise in sym-
bolism, political desperation, and policy gimmickry, with little anchoring in solid economics
.... Deficits in themselves are neither good nor bad. They promote neither inflation nor
unemployment. They cause neither inflation nor expansion. In fact, they are absolute eco-
nomic eunuchs until they join hands with other policies and other economic facts." 128
CoNG. Rac. H3019 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1980) (statement of Rep. Stockman).
43. The CBO Study makes clear that the consequences of a deficit depend on the condi-
tion of the economy: "[P]ersistent and large deficits portend continued difficulties in lower-
ing interest rates and encouraging economic growth. Additionally, when the economy is
operating close to capacity, a deficit contributes to inflationary pressures. Moreover, service
of a growing national debt is preempting an ever larger share of the budget .... While
concern over the implications of chronic deficits for long-run growth and for inflation is
warranted, a federal deficit can be an important instrument for countering a recession. A
deficit can help moderate income losses during a recession, thereby lowering the risk of a
deeper decline in the economy. Moreover, in a prolonged or severe downturn, planned
deficits--from a tax cut or temporary expenditure rise-can help to reverse the economic
slide. A budget forced to be in surplus or balance during a downswing in the business cycle
would harm rather than help the faltering economy." CBO STUDY, supra note 2, at 4-5.
taxation and expenditures. And, of course, the monetary policy of the
United States-in particular the actions of the Federal Reserve
Board-are nonfiscal policies that play an important part in our na-
tional economic policy.
In sum, a balanced budget is but one of a number of objectives
that the federal government, with limited resources, must attempt to
achieve simultaneously. It is but a part of our fiscal policy, which in
turn is a part of the overall economic policy of the United States. Ele-
vating this one goal to constitutional status makes no more sense than
enshrining any other goals, such as stable value of money, social secur-
ity, low interest rates, full employment, or, for that matter, sufficient
nuclear capability, in the Constitution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that a constitutional amend-
ment could produce a "norm" of a balanced budget, the effect on other
competing goals would likely be substantial. In prepared testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Monopolies
and Commercial Law, David Stockman, Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, suggested that "non-defense spending" was "the
driving force behind the present fiscal disequilibrium."' " This state-
ment suggests that the current Administration would sacrifice the goals
of these programs to achieve a balanced budget. It is not clear, how-
ever, that social programs would suffer the most. My Republican col-
league, Henry Hyde, has expressed his fear that our national defense
interests would suffer under an amendment requiring a balanced
budget.4" Even assuming across the board spending cuts, the effect on
other macroeconomic goals such as full employment and high produc-
tivity might be devastating. A study done by the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) using the
econometric model of Data Resources, Inc., projects that, if a balanced
budget were effected in 1985, by 1987 the number of persons unem-
ployed would increase by 2.65 million and the GNP would be reduced
by $519 billion. 6 The Congressional Budget Office confirms that im-
plementation at an early date "could endanger the economic recovery
and create widespread dislocations." 47
44. Hearings, supra note 24, at 2.
45. Hyde, Balanced Budget Amendment: Can we Make it Work?, Wash. Post, July 19,
1982, at A13, col. 2.
46. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 395 (statement of Gerald W. McEntee, International
President, AFSCME).
47. Hearings, supra note 5, at 529 (statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Congres-
sional Budget Office).
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The implementation of a balanced budget as a "norm" could
wreak havoc with other federal goals. As James Madison recognized,
spending and taxation authority are closely related to the ability of the
federal government to achieve popular objectives: "This power over
the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate represent-
atives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for
the carrying into effect every just and salutary measure."48 A limitation
on federal fiscal authority would inhibit the ability of the government
to carry out the popular will.
III. Economic and Budgetary Considerations Counsel Against
Adoption of a Constitutional Amendment
A. Short Term: Circumvention and Timing
The preceding discussion has assumed that an amendment would
achieve a balanced budget. Proponents also urge that it would some-
how help resolve our current economic difficulties. Neither proposition
withstands scrutiny.
A drafter of an amendment must make it sufficiently flexible to
allow for necessary deviations, while not creating so much flexibility
that the amendment would be meaningless.4 9 H.R.J. Res. 350 does not
require a balanced budget, but it does mandate that the Congress plan
for one. Section 1 requires that Congress adopt a balanced budget plan
and that the President and the Congress somehow "ensure" that actual
outlays not exceed statement outlays. There is no mechanism to guar-
antee that actual receipts equal statement receipts. Therefore, if there
is a shortfall of receipts, nothing need be done about it, and a deficit
will ensue. This loophole will, of course, create a strong incentive for
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 391 (J. Madison) (Harvard ed. 1961).
49. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volker testified: "[I] can only be impressed
by the difficulty of attempting to write a constitutional provision to induce discipline other-
wise lacking[;] ... a provision that will serve us in fair weather and foul, and in economic
circumstances that can only be dimly foreseen." Hearings, supra note 5, at 75 (statement of
Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). At his
confirmation hearings, OMB Director Stockman testified: "[I] have become convinced that
the process of trying to define what an outlay of the Government is, what its revenues are, is
far more complicated than most people anticipate, and that if we require a balance in terms
of the definitions of outlays and revenues that we have today, some people would invent a
way to get around it. Loan guarantees, off-budget expenditures, and various other creative
accounting techniques. . . would be developed to totally frustrate or circumvent the pur-
poses of that kind of requirement." Nomination of David 4. Stockman: Hearing before the
Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Stockman Confirmation].
Congress-the very body proponents so distrust-to adopt a rosy fore-
cast of receipts to circumvent the limitations on a planned deficit.
There are other loopholes that, in the words of Professor Laurence
Tribe, are "[e]ach big enough to drive the federal budget through."5 °
Without limitations, Congress could transfer federal programs to the
private sector through regulation; charter federal corporations to tax
and spend outside the budget; pass on burdens to the states; and use
loan guarantees in place of direct spending."
Pressure to employ such subterfuges would undoubtedly increase
if a supermajority were required to approve a deficit. If, as proponents
suggest, constitutional restraints are necessary because our elected offi-
cials have acted irresponsibly, it is clear that H.R.J. Res. 350 will not
preclude similar conduct in the future. Use of these ruses would be
particularly dangerous because, in many instances, their mechanisms
are more insulated from political control than is the current federal
budget process.5 Circumvention of the budget process would put these
items outside the scrutiny of the annual review procedure developed
through the President's Office of Management and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Act. Thus, the economic result of a constitu-
tional amendment could well be decreased accountability in, and popu-
lar control of, the federal budget process.
Even assuming that a balanced budget requirement would be ef-
fective, due to a delay in implementation, it could not help us out of
our current economic troubles. H.R.J. Res. 350 provides that it shall be
effective in the second fiscal year after ratification. Assuming that the
Ninety-eighth Congress had approved a similar amendment and sent it
forth for ratification in 1983, the states would likely take several years
to approve it. If it were to have been ratified in 1984, it would not have
become effective until fiscal 1986. The government will certainly have
to take steps before then to curb the mounting deficits, lest we face dire
economic consequences. As OMB Director Stockman testified in his
1981 confirmation hearings, "if we don't move to a sounder fiscal posi-
tion within the next few years, we are going to have such serious eco-
nomic problems that we won't have to worry about a constitutional
50. Hearings, supra note 5, at 295 (testimony of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law
School).
51. See supra note 49. "But I think the very practical problem is how do you define
spending? Once you begin to unravel that onion, it unravels and unravels and unravels
forever. There are any number of innovative means that could be developed to circumvent
that type of constitutional amendment." Stockman Confirmation, supra note 49 at 56.
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amendment."53 Recognizing the immediacy of the problems, a number
of statutory proposals have been introduced to require a balanced
budget in the immediate future.54 The Administration has not sup-
ported these proposals.
B. Long Term: Reduced Flexibility and Difficulties of Forecasting
In the long term, a balanced budget amendment would introduce
undesirable rigidities into the federal budget process and would require
Congress to predict and control that which it cannot-the future.
Amendment proponents view past federal fiscal policy as the source of
the current problem. 5 Unquestionably, a huge federal debt can harm
the economy.56 The interplay between fiscal policy and the economy is
complex, however, and, to a certain extent, short term growth of the
deficit is attributable to immediate problems of the economy.57
Assuming just for argument that the deficit is the result of fiscal
abuses, the fact of past abuses is insufficient reason to limit future use
of fiscal policy. Since the time of Lord Keynes, it has been widely rec-
ognized that "automatic stabilizers" in the federal budget moderate
fluctuations in the economy and prevent depressions. In times of high
unemployment and sinking demand, jobless benefits and other pay-
ments are important stimuli; in times of excess demand and inflation,
surplus revenue caused by the progressive tax system is a natural
damper on demand.
The balanced budget and revenue limitations provisions of H.R.J.
Res. 350 would undermine the budget's "automatic stabilizers" by re-
quiring extraordinary procedures for their use. Under Section 1, with-
out approval of a supermajority, planned outlays could not exceed
planned receipts and actual outlays could not exceed planned outlays.
Under Section 2, without use of special procedures, receipts could not
grow at a rate faster than the growth of the national income in the
53. Stockman Confirmation, supra note 49, at 58-59.
54. See, e.g., H.R. 6834,97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H4535 (1982); H.R. 6962,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H5619 (1982).
55. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-41.
56. See supra note 43.
57. In his confirmation hearings, OMB Director Stockman attributed the deficits during
the Carter Administration to the economy, and not to irresponsible spending: "[B]ut there is
no way you can really say there has been some kind of wreckless [sic] attitude, a spending
spree on Capitol Hill in terms of policy actions. What has happened instead is that the
economy has collapsed out from under the budget. This deterioration, both on the produc-
tion side of the economy and in the financial markets, has simply driven outlays upward and
revenues downward in an uncontrollable way." Stockman Confirmation, supra note 49, at
25.
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previous calendar year. And, because planned outlays could not ex-
ceed planned receipts, outlays as well as receipts would be tied to the
previous year's change in national income.
The combined operation of these provisions, absent the use of the
special procedures, would ordinarily result in government fiscal policy
that would worsen inflation and recession, rather than counter them.
The harmful effects of the proposed amendment would be felt in at
least four situations. (1) In a recession, a planned stimulative tax cut
would have to be counterbalanced by a decrease in planned outlays,
and any increase in planned outlays would need to be offset by in-
creased revenue. (2) Planned increases in outlays would be tied to in-
creases in planned receipts, with receipts linked to the growth of
national income. In a prolonged recession, national income would de-
cline, planned receipts for subsequent fiscal years would also decline,
and hence planned outlays would decline. (3) If an unanticipated re-
cession occurs during a fiscal year, requiring increased outlays for un-
employment compensation, there would have to be outlay reductions in
other areas. (4) In inflationary periods, Section 2 would prohibit natu-
rally occurring increases in tax revenues that would cool demand.
If it worked as proponents anticipate, H.R.J. Res. 350 would thus
tend to exacerbate, rather than counteract, market fluctuations. Rather
than serving as a natural stabilizer, fiscal policy would tend to
destabilize our economy. This could shift responsibility for economic
stability entirely to the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy.58
Quite apart from its inherent destabilizing effect, H.R.J. Res. 350
would require a result-a balanced budget-which is to some degree
beyond the government's control. Economics is such an inexact "sci-
ence" that economists using similar assumptions about the future reach
vastly different conclusions. For example, "supply siders" and tradi-
tionalists differ over whether tax cuts lead to increased or decreased
revenues. Second, and more basically, budgeting requires predictions
of future events. Crop failures, natural disasters, the need for military
buildups, and unexpected recessions are examples of exigencies that
might change the levels of federal outlays and receipts in a fiscal pe-
riod, yet could not be anticipated at the time the budget is written. If
the actual outlays could not exceed planned outlays, the government's
ability to react to unforeseeable events would be severely restricted; if,
on the other hand, the federal government responds, actual outlays
would exceed planned outlays and the budget would not be balanced.
58. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 532 (statement of Alice M. Riviin); CBO STUDY,
supra note 2, at 112.
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For such reasons, economist and Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson has
suggested that attempting to impose constitutional strictures on the
budgeting process is "arrogant folly."
5 9
IV. Political and Constitutional Considerations Counsel
Against Adoption of an Amendment
A. Enforceability and Separation of Powers Considerations
If an amendment were unenforceable, its "requirements" would
become mere aspirations and the amendment an empty exhortation
that means be found and goals attained.
If, on the other hand, the amendment were enforceable, there
could be profound alteration of the traditional allocation of powers
among the branches of government. To make certain that the purposes
of the amendment were carried out, the Executive, the Judiciary, or
both, would have to be empowered to review congressional budgetary
decisionmaking.60 The two most commonly discussed techniques for
the Executive to enforce the amendment are impoundment and item
vetoes. Both would vastly increase the power of the Executive over the
Congress in budgetary decisions.
An item veto would permit the President to pick and choose
among appropriated items, approving only those that conformed to the
President's policies. It would remove much of the Executive's incentive
to compromise in the budgetary process. The President's decisions
could be overcome only if the veto were overridden. Impoundment
would give the Executive even greater authority than would an item
veto because the Executive could refuse to spend any money or could
fix expenditures for an appropriated item at any amount up to the full
appropriation. It is unclear whether Congress could override an im-
poundment decision.61
59. Constitutional-Amendments to Balance the Federal Budget: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 23 (1979-80) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Samuelson).
60. See CBO STUDY, supra note 2, at 112. Mr. Stockman has admitted: "The effect
then would be to throw into the courts in one way or another the responsibility for defining
expenditures, and the responsibility would not simply stop with definition. It would sooner
or later have to move to substantive considerations and decisions as well and in the process,
the Congress would have alienated one of the central and essential powers that were granted
by the Constitution; namely, the power to raise and spend money for the public interests of
this country." Stockman Confirmation, supra note 49, at 56.
61. The relative scope of congressional and executive power is largely undefined, as
constitutionality of impoundment has never been decided. Most cases are settled through
the political process. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 193-98 (1978).
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Giving the Executive these powers would be inconsistent with our
basic Constitutional structure. The Constitution designates the Con-
gress as the taxing and spending authority. So fundamental is the need
for popular control over these decisions that the Constitution specifi-
cally provides that revenue bills shall originate in the House,62 and it is
a long established tradition that appropriation bills originate there as
well. 63 The historical instances in which Presidents have claimed im-
poundment powers have led to widespread concern64 and legislation to
prevent and control impoundment.65
Judicial supervision of legislative decisionmaking on the budget is
equally inappropriate. As explained earlier,66 budgetary decisions are
quintessentially legislative because they involve the reconciliation of
competing national priorities. A judicial forum simply is not suited to
make such choices. Courts do not maintain staffs of budgetary experts.
Article III judges have no political constituency; indeed, their life ten-
ure is intended to insulate them from the political process. The relief
that courts may grant to enforce a balanced budget amendment is lim-
ited.67 Finally, the multiplicity of district courts and courts of appeals
creates the possibility of conflicting judgments about a single national
62. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
63. See R. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CON-
GRESS 1 (1966).
64. President Nixon, in particular, used impoundment as a device to implement Execu-
tive policies, rearrange national priorities, and undercut legislative decisions. A. SCHICK,
CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING 45-48 (1980).
"The executive branch has unilaterally set aside congressionally approved programs it
deems less worthy than others and nullified national policies established by Congress. Crit-
ics assert that by these acts the executive branch has encroached upon the legitimate role of
Congress in establishing spending priorities, eroded Constitutional balance of powers be-
tween the legislative and executive branches, aggrandized executive power, exercised an
item veto never authorized by Congress, and created chaos in the operations of State and
local governments." H.R. REP. No. 658, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3462, 3471.
65. See Impoundment Control Act of 1974 §§ 1001-17, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-07 (1976).
66. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
67. Noted constitutional expert Professor Philip B. Kurland has succinctly described the
limited remedies that a court might have if actual outlays appeared to exceed statement
outlays:
"[W]hat could the courts do to enforce the proposed amendment? It is possible, how-
ever unlikely, that the courts would declare all the appropriations laws for the budget year
invalid. Or the courts could feel free to pick and choose among the appropriations meas-
ures, validating enough to meet the income requirements and invalidate the rest ...
"Equally unlikely, the courts could say that all appropriations should be reduced by
that proportion in which the total outlay exceeds the authorized outlay. Or, again with the
same likelihood, the courts could say that all appropriations measures passed before the
limit was reached would be valid and all passed after that would be invalid." Hearings,
supra note 5, at 344 (statement of Prof. Philip B. Kurland, Univ. of Chicago Law School).
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budget that could be slow to resolve, possibly bringing the entire gov-
ernment's fiscal machinery to a standstill.
Perhaps recognizing these difficulties, H.R.J. Res. 350 is vague
about enforcement. The only explicit reference to enforceability is Sec-
tion l's statement that the President and the Congress shall "ensure"
that actual outlays do not exceed planned outlays. The report of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on an identical text suggests that
this provision in Section 1 is not intended to establish any new presi-
dential authority to impound appropriated funds.6 1 Yet, this interpre-
tation is not clear from the text of the amendment.69
If the President could not impound funds or exercise an item veto,
how could Section 1 be enforced? Although the Senate report states
that the President would be confined to existing tools such as proposing
budgets and general veto authority,70 constitutional scholar Laurence
Tribe reaches a different conclusion-impoundment would not only be
permissible but commonplace:
On the face of it, this constitutional command would seem to
override any merely statutory limit on executive impoundment
authority, such as that of the 1974 Impoundment Act. And if the
President concludes that only impoundment, decreed pursuant to
his Article II powers as Chief Executive, can meet his duties
under the new Amendment, then such an act-involving a refusal
to spend appropriated funds on whichever programs the President
chooses to designate as the causes of excessive total outlays-could
well be deemed authorized by the new Amendment.'
H.R.J. Res. 350 says nothing about the role of the judiciary in en-
forcing the amendment. The Senate report states that, by remaining
silent, this text does not preclude the federal courts from intervening in
budgetary matters. While acknowledging the traditional role of courts
in constitutional interpretation, the report suggests that concepts of
standing, political question, and justiciability will restrain the judici-
ary.72 An amendment precluding judicial review was defeated in the
Senate.73 Absent such a flat prohibition, it is likely that the federal
courts would soon face a flood of lawsuits from taxpayers, recipients of
outlays, members of Congress, and others claiming violation of the
68. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 61.
69. The full Senate amended § 1 because it was not clear that no additional impound-
ment authority was created. See supra note 28.
70. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 60-61.
71. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 301 (statement of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe) (emphasis
added).
72. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
73. 128 CONG. REC. S9392-407 (daily ed. July 29, 1982).
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amendment. In cases in which courts determined to pass on the merits,
they would soon be embroiled in technical questions of budgetary defi-
nitions,74 and likely be called upon to resolve confrontations between
the Executive and the Congress, and even among factions within Con-
gress. It would be unfair to burden the judicial system with such ques-
tions and unwise to afford it such authority.
The power to tax and spend "is generally believed to be the most
fundamental legislative power in representative democracies."75  An
enforceable constitutional amendment would strip the legislative
branch of much of its budgetary authority, and thus fundamentally al-
ter the previous allocation of power among the three branches of gov-
ernment. As OMB Director Stockman testified at his confirmation
hearing, by adopting a balanced budget amendment, "the Congress
would have alienated one of the central and essential powers that were
granted by the Constitution; namely, the power to raise and spend
money for the public interests of this country."76
B. Legislative Impasses
The requirements of H.R.J. Res. 350 would increase the possibility
of legislative impasses that would halt government operations. For ex-
ample, Section 1 commands Congress to formulate a statement of re-
ceipts and outlays before the beginning of the fiscal year. If Congress
were unable to reach an agreement on a budget statement, there would
be no outlay projection, and, presumably, the government would shut
down because any outlay would not be within an outlay projected by a
statement.77 And, if a deficit were planned, the process of formulating
a timely statement would become even more difficult because of the
supermajority requirement. Similarly, if it appeared during a fiscal
year that actual outlays could exceed statement outlays, it might be im-
possible to find a majority to cut outlays or raise taxes or a
supermajority to approve a deficit. For example, even if fifty-five per-
cent of the members of each House favored increasing outlays rather
74. For example, what constitutes "outlays," "receipts," or "national income"? So con-
troversial and difficult are the definitional questions that the Administration has proposed
the creation of a Bipartisan Budget Concepts Commission to formulate definitions. See
Hearings, supra note 5, at 242 (statement of Hon. David A. Stockman).
75. R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEE 17 (1973).
76. Stockman Confirmation, supra note 49, at 56.
77. If Congress did not adopt a statement in time, "there is an implied adoption of a
statement in which both receipts and outlays are zero. In conjunction with the fourth sen-
tence of this Section [Section 1], the Congress and the President would be mandated consti-
tutionally to ensure that fiscal year outlays also would be zero." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 46.
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than cutting outlays or increasing taxes, a determined minority in one
House could force the government to cease operations when actual out-
lays equalled projected outlays.7"
Recent experience under the Congressional Budget Act of 197419
shows that it is sometimes impossible for Congress to obtain even ma-
jority approval of a budget resolution before the expiration of exter-
nally imposed deadlines.8 0 The inability to meet such deadlines reflects
the depth of sincerely held-though differing-views on national pri-
orities, not irresponsibility or lack of effort. Although H.R.J. Res. 350
would require agreement and is clear on the consequences of failure to
reach a majority or supermajority, it would not-and could not-pro-
vide any mechanism for ordering priorities. Permitting another branch
of government to do so-for example, the Judiciary-would be rank
interference by one branch of government (in this instance, an
unelected branch) in the affairs of another.
C. Minority Rule
The requirement of a supermajority for certain budgetary deci-
sions would enable a minority to thwart the will of the majority. The
Senate report contends that the amendment would make the budget
process more democratic,8 but precisely the opposite is true. If, as
Webster's postulates, "democracy" is "government by the people; esp.
rule of the majority," 82 then the supermajority provision of H.R.J. Res.
350 would limit the power of a simple majority to plan deficits, and so
would be undemocratic.
The legislative process set forth in the Constitution is based on
majority rule. Special minority rights are granted only in limited cir-
cumstances, such as votes on impeachment in the Senate,83 exclusion of
members of Congress, 84 veto overrides, 85 Senate approval of treaties,86
78. The difficulty of enforcing the outlay limitations is compounded by the fact that the
federal government does not finish computing its outlays until at least 20 days after the close
of the fiscal year. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 89 (statement of Rudolph G. Penner, econo-
mist, American Enterprise Institute).
79. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 §§ 101-906, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-53 (1976).
80. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(h), Congress is scheduled to complete action on the second
concurrent resolution of the budget by Sept. 15 of each year. For the past several years, this
action has been completed, if at all, in Nov.
81. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
82. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 299 (1979).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
84. Id at art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
85. Id at art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
86. Id at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
and recommended amendments to the Constitution. 7 These excep-
tions protect individual rights, check the power of the Executive, give
meaning to executive veto power, or require a broad consensus on
changing fundamental law. The vast majority of legislative decisions 8
are entrusted to majority rule. Although the Constitution requires a
simple majority to declare war, under H.R.J. Res. 350 it would take a
supermajority to vote even a small planned deficit. Surely, requiring
an enhanced majority in budget matters would be inconsistent with our
constitutional commitment to majority rule.
V. Alternative Solutions
Proponents of the amendment argue that the federal budget pro-
cess is biased toward a few groups that have intense interest in ob-
taining special spending legislation or preserving tax loopholes because
the benefits to them are so great. The vast majority of citizens, accord-
ing to the argument, have little incentive to resist these appeals because
the incremental cost of each program is small.8 9 In addition, propo-
nents suggest that Congressional organization is based on committees
which have an interest in perpetuating the programs and benefits
within their jurisdiction. These biases, it is argued, can only be recti-
fied by constitutional means.90
Assuming that these biases do exist, corrective action is within ex-
isting congressional authority. If analysis were to show that special in-
terest groups exert undue leverage, changes in rules governing
financing of congressional campaigns might be considered. 91 If the
problem relates to the organization of Congress by committee, Con-
gress could consider changing its rules. The Congressional Budget Act
of 1974 has already curbed the power of committees. 92 If further re-
87. Id at art. V.
88. Id at art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
89. See supra note 3.
90. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-43.
91. See generally, Symposium on Political Campaign Finance Reform, 10 HAST. CONST.
L.Q. (1983).
In the Ninety-seventh Congress, several House members joined in introducing legisla-
tion, H.R. 4070, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H4111 (1981), that would limit to
$75,000 per campaign the total amount any candidate for the House of Representatives
could receive from authorized Political Action Committees. Other groups have urged public
financing for election campaigns.
92. Congressional Budget Act of 1974 §§ 101-906, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-53 (1976) and
scattered sections of the United States Code. The general purpose of this important legisla-
tion was to bring increased cohesion to the authorization and appropriations process. The
basic technique that the Act employs is for Congress to consider the federal budget as a
whole rather than piecemeal. The Act reduced the powers of individual committees over the
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strictions or different approaches to budgeting are in order, the Act
might be strengthened.
Other goals of the proposed constitutional amendment could also
be achieved without it. Congress has already taken action to combat
"bracket creep" by indexing tax rates statutorily93 Finally, nothing
prevents Congress from adopting a balanced budget policy today. The
pent-up public frustration might be better channelled to challenging
specific items in the budgets the President and the Congress work out
today, rather than tilting at constitutional windmills. If a majority
wants a balanced budget declared the "norm," appropriate legislation
establishing that "norm" would be entirely possible.94
While some rule reform may be called for, ultimately only firm
political resolve can control budget growth. If the political will does
not exist, a constitutional amendment will not help. If the will does
exist, created by "an aroused popular conscience that sears the con-
science of the people's representatives," 95 an amendment would not be
needed to bring about the fiscal balance we all want.
Conclusion
The Senate report correctly observed that H.R.J. Res. 350 repre-
sents "economic policy. '9 6 In a famous dissent, Mr. Justice Holmes
once warned that the Constitution is not intended to "embody a partic-
ular economic theory."97 An objective analysis of H.R.J. Res. 350 af-
firms the wisdom of Justice Holmes' injunction.
Adoption of H.R.J. Res. 350 would do nothing to solve our cur-
rent, crushing economic problems. Ratification could take as long as
seven years, and implementation would take another two years. Mean-
spending process by placing committee authorization decisions on rigid timetables, creating
budget committees in the House and Senate to recommend spending totals by subject cate-
gory, requiring cost estimates on reported bills by the Congressional Budget Office, and
providing for House and Senate floor consideration of committee spending recommenda-
tions simultaneously with those of other committees. See generall, A. SCHICK, CONGRESS
AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING (1980).
93. See supra note 7.
94. While proponents have argued that a legislative approach would be ineffective be-
cause subsequent inconsistent legislative action can implicitly repeal a statute, some ap-
proaches, such as that adopted in H.R. 6834, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4535
(daily ed. July 22, 1982) (co-sponsored by Rep. William Hughes and Rep. Henry Hyde),
circumvent this problem by making the consideration of an unbalanced budget subject to a
point of order.
95. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
97. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
while, this proposal would not shave a single point off interest rates or
inflation, or trim one dollar off the deficit.
The Constitution is a document designed to guarantee fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms, and to provide for the orderly operation of
government. If implanted into the Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 350 would
guarantee nothing. As this analysis has shown, H.R.J. Res. 350 pro-
vides for a balanced budget--except when three-fifths of Congress says
otherwise; when revenues fall below estimates; when there is a declared
war; when Congress can't agree on raising taxes; or when Congress just
decides to circumvent it.
The supermajority restrictions of the proposed amendment could
actually decrease the budgetary controls painstakingly being developed
through the President's Office of Management and Budget and the pro-
cedures of the Congressional Budget Act. Circumventions of the budg-
etary procedure would result in items being placed outside the careful
scrutiny that yearly budgetary review entails.
A single and, in isolation, a rather meaningless measurement of
the overall economic policy of this nation, should not be enshrined in
the Constitution. Today's measure of a responsible budgetary policy
may be an amusing historical anecdote to the next generation of
economists.
Alexander Hamilton cautioned against writing mere parchment
provisions into the Constitution because "nations pay little regard to
rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the
necessities of society." 98 He counseled:
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government
with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that
every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by neces-
sity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained
in the breast of rulers towiard the constitution of a country, and
forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of ne-
cessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable!99
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 212-13 (A. Hamilton) (Harvard ed. 1961).
99. Id
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